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Abstract
We reconsider the connection between ﬁnancial crises and economic recover-
ies in the postwar United States. We proceed in two steps. First, we provide
a chronology of ﬁnancial crises in the United States. We make the case that
the postwar period prior to 2007 should be characterized as featuring three pe-
riods of ﬁnancial crisis: 1973−1975, 1982−1984, and 1988−1991. This implies a
substantially diﬀerent postwar chronology of ﬁnancial crises from that advanced
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a, 2009b). The second step in our analysis is to
reexamine economic recoveries in the wake of ﬁnancial crises with this revised
chronology. We ﬁnd that the regularity that recoveries are systematically slower
in the aftermath of ﬁnancial crises does not hold for the postwar United States.
Historically, the pace of the expansion after recessions seems to reﬂect aggregate
demand conditions.
JEL classiﬁcation: E32; E52; G21.
Key words: Financial crises, economic recoveries, aggregate demand policy.
∗We are indebted to Michael Bordo, Benjamin Friedman, Charles Goodhart, Michael Kiley, Loretta
Mester, Gary Richardson, Christina Romer, David Romer, Luis Servén, Angel Ubide, Egon Zakra-
jšek, and workshop participants at the Federal Reserve Board and the July 2010 NBER Monetary
Economics Summer Institute for comments on earlier versions of this paper. We thank Benjamin
Brookins and Kathleen Easterbrook for research assistance. The views expressed in this paper are
solely the responsibility of the authors, and should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the views of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal
Reserve System. Email addresses: david.lopez-salido@frb.gov, edward.nelson@frb.gov.
1 Introduction
“If you think back to the Great Depression, it’s actually getting the real economy going
[that ] was the main thing that, that helped. . . bring the banks around.”
Christina Romer, March 15, 2009
Financial market weakness is widely acknowledged as having played a major part
in the recent economic downturn in the United States. This experience has raised the
prospect that ﬁnancial weakness may also prevent a rapid economic recovery. There
would surely be wide agreement that a stronger ﬁnancial sector would contribute to a
more robust economic outlook. But there is greater room for doubt on the question
of whether ﬁnancial weakness would likely stand in the way if elements traditionally
associated with economic recovery point toward a rapid expansion. Is it the case,
for example, that ﬁnancial recovery is a precondition for economic recovery–in other
words, that ﬁnancial strain can be expected to prevent a strong recovery? Or should
we expect factors normally associated with strong economic rebounds–for example,
substantial degrees of monetary and ﬁscal stimulus–to promote a major upturn in
growth even when the ﬁnancial system is weak?
The study of past episodes of ﬁnancial distress may cast light on these issues.
In this spirit, an inﬂuential series of studies by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008a, 2008b,
2009a, 2009b) has turned to the historical experience of a variety of countries. Among
the conclusions that Reinhart and Rogoﬀ reach on the basis of a study of postwar
experience are: (i) “the aftermath of banking crises is associated with profound declines
in output and employment” (2009b, p. 224), and (ii) the aftermath of these crises is
systematically associated with weak economic recoveries, so that “growth is sometimes
quite modest in the aftermath” of ﬁnancial crises (2009b, p. 235).
Item (i) of these ﬁndings seems to ring true for the United States, and is in keeping
with the emphasis put on the relationship between ﬁnancial crises and severe economic
contractions in the United States by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and others. Item
(ii) of the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ ﬁndings seems, however, appears to be at variance with
evidence for the United States. A number of studies of U.S. business cycle history have
found that severe recessions are followed by rapid economic expansion: for example,
Friedman (1964, 1993), Neftci (1986), Kim and Nelson (1999), Morley and Piger (2005),
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and Sinclair (2009). This seems to be such a well established regularity for the United
States that it would be surprising if recoveries from recessions associated with ﬁnancial
crises amounted to exceptions to the rule. Moreover, the experience of the United States
during the most severe ﬁnancial crisis in its history–the Great Depression–would not
appear to provide an exception to the pattern of economic recoveries just described.
Friedman and Schwartz’s (1963) chapter on the recovery from the Great Contraction
opens with the words, “As we have seen, severe contractions tend to be succeeded by
vigorous rebounds. The 1929−33 contraction was no exception.”1 Likewise, Romer
(1992, p. 757) has emphasized that the 1930s witnessed a “spectacular” recovery that
was able to proceed against the backdrop of a weak banking system. Romer argues that
aggregate demand stimulus was responsible for the strength of the recovery; the repair
of the banking system, while important, was not a precondition for a strong recovery.
And, as noted in the quotation from Romer given above, once economic recovery was
in process, it was a major factor in restoring the ﬁnancial system to health.2
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009b) conclusion about weak recoveries was based over-
whelmingly on experiences outside the United States.3 But the authors have not hesi-
tated to draw implications for the United States from their ﬁndings on recoveries from
ﬁnancial crises, both in their discussion in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a, 2009b) and
elsewhere. For example, in a television appearance in November 2009, Kenneth Rogoﬀ
said, “Well, when you have a typical recession, a typical U.S. recession, you roar out
of it. You grow at double normal, and even more sometimes. This was not a typi-
cal recession. This was a ﬁnancial crisis-ampliﬁed recession. And when you look at
other countries in other places–I know we’re diﬀerent, but we’re not–you grow much
slower, because the ﬁnancial system is impaired, it takes lots of times to ﬁgure out your
regulation, the debt problems that you inherited are always big. . . I mean, the norm
1Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 493; emphasis added).
2This quotation is from a Meet the Press interview (March 15, 2009). In context, what CEA Chair
Romer said was, “I don’t agree with the idea that you–that, that stimulus can’t do anything until
the ﬁnancial rescue is done. I think, in truth, those things go parallel. And if you think back to the
Great Depression, it’s actually–getting the real economy going was the main thing that, that helped
to make, bring the banks around.”
3Likewise, Terrones, Scott, and Kannan (2009), who ﬁnd that ﬁnancial crises are associated with
systematically slower recoveries, draw their conclusions predominantly from non-U.S. experiences.
This is especially the case because these authors follow Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009a) characterization
of the postwar United States as having had only a single pre-2007 postwar ﬁnancial crisis.
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that Carmen Reinhart and I ﬁnd coming from these ﬁnancial crises is you grow slow
for a while.”4 Similarly, Reinhart (2009) took the generalizations reached in Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2009a) as applicable to “the current episode in the U.S.”
We reconsider below the connection between ﬁnancial crises and economic recov-
eries in the postwar United States. Throughout, we treat recoveries as referring to
upturns in real GDP. This focus reﬂects the fact that what is at issue is whether
the rate of economic growth is rapid after a ﬁnancial crisis. It is not disputed that,
even if rapid growth in aggregate output takes place, it may take several years for
the level of the output gap to be closed after a severe downturn; indeed, that point
is acknowledged in discussions that have emphasized the strength of the recovery of
output in the Great Depression, such as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Romer
(1992). Focusing on output growth is also preferable to concentrating on employment
or unemployment; these labor-market-based indices of economic activity may not ade-
quately capture cyclical recoveries in aggregate production if employment is a lagging
indicator, or if supply-side changes alter the relationship between the labor input and
ﬁnal aggregate output.
We ﬁnd that the regularity that recoveries are systematically slower in the wake
of ﬁnancial crises does not hold for the postwar United States. We arrive at this
conclusion in two steps. The ﬁrst step is a revision of the chronology of ﬁnancial
crises in the United States. We lay out this revised chronology in Section 2. The
reconsideration of the postwar record leads us to a chronology substantially diﬀerent
from that in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b). Reinhart and Rogoﬀ characterize the United
States as having had a single pre-2007 postwar ﬁnancial crisis, one beginning in 1984.
Our examination of the U.S. experience casts doubt on this choice. We question the
notion that the United States had no other ﬁnancial crisis in the postwar period until
2007, and also question the choice of 1984 for the date of the inception of the single
pre-2007 crisis that Reinhart and Rogoﬀ acknowledge.5
We argue that banking developments in the 1970s justify classifying 1973−1975 as
a ﬁnancial crisis for the United States. Furthermore, while Reinhart and Rogoﬀ date
the savings and loan (S&L) crisis to 1984 or to 1984−1991, there is little justiﬁcation
4Charlie Rose Show (November 10, 2009), pp. 9, 10 of transcript.
5Our chronology also necessarily departs from treatments, such as that of Cecchetti, Kohler, and
Upper (2009), that deny any pre-2007 ﬁnancial crisis in the postwar United States.
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for dating this crisis as early as 1984. The periods of intense S&L failures were con-
centrated in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and were not spread over 1984−1991; a
more appropriate date for the S&L crisis, and that used in Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven,
and Noguera (2005), is 1988−1991. We argue that, contrary to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s
chronology, the early 1980s were not free of ﬁnancial crisis; rather, this period saw the
impairment of U.S. banks’ position due to the international debt crisis, and this crisis
is appropriately dated to 1982−1984. Thus, our postwar chronology points to three
periods of pre-2007 U.S. ﬁnancial crisis: Crisis I (1973−1975), Crisis II (1982−1984),
and Crisis III (1988−1991), in contrast to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009a, 2009b) single,
protracted 1984−1991 crisis.
The second step in our analysis is to reexamine economic recoveries in the wake
of ﬁnancial crises with this revised chronology. We carry out this reexamination in
Sections 3 and 4. We ﬁnd no basis for the notion that these recoveries are systematically
weaker than the norm. The recoveries in output that began in 1975 and after 1982 were
vigorous rebounds. The recovery following the 1990−1991 recession was mild, but, as
many observers have noted (for example, Taylor, 1998), the downturn in output in
1990−1991 was itself shallow. Rather than reﬂecting a systematic association between
ﬁnancial crises and weak recoveries, the gentle recovery of the early 1990s may have
been the mirror image of a relatively shallow recession, and it is also consistent with the
restrained monetary policy of the early 1990s. In addition, an examination of aggregate
bank lending behavior in each episode, which we conduct in Section 4, suggests that a
weak lending outlook is not an insurmountable obstacle to the operation of stimulative
aggregate demand policies. We present econometric evidence in Section 5 that suggests
that U.S. economic recoveries in the wake of ﬁnancial crises are not signiﬁcantly weaker
than other recoveries once the size of the prior contraction is taken into account. We
conclude that slow recoveries in the wake of ﬁnancial crises cannot be said to be an
established stylized fact in the case of the United States.
2 A chronology of postwar U.S. ﬁnancial crises
In this section we make the case postwar U.S. history should be characterized as featur-
ing three ﬁnancial crises before 2007: those in 1973−1975, 1982−1984, and 1988−1991.
We consider each crisis in turn. The ﬁrst two crises have no counterpart on Reinhart
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and Rogoﬀ’s (2008b, 2009b) chronology; accordingly, we highlight several aspects of
these crises that meet Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009b, p. 215) criterion of “bank-centered
ﬁnancial crises.”
2.1 Basis for deﬁning a ﬁnancial crisis
Despite frequent references to ﬁnancial crises in macroeconomic discussions, no con-
sensus exists on a precise deﬁnition. As Benjamin Friedman (1991, p. 19) observes,
“It is diﬃcult to specify with precision just what a ﬁnancial crisis is, but most people
in the business and ﬁnancial world apparently sense that they would recognize one if
they experienced it.”
Schwartz (1986) proposes a qualitative characteristic for deﬁning ﬁnancial crises.
Schwartz associates with crises the emergence of traditional bank runs involving the
conversion by households en masse of their deposits into currency. But because this
deﬁnition focuses on such retail deposit runs, strict adherence to her deﬁnition would
overlook those banking crises that arise from the drying-up of their wholesale funding.
Such episodes of wholesale funding distress can take place even in situations where–
thanks largely to deposit insurance–runs on aggregate retail deposits are minor or
absent. As we discuss further below, ever since the 1970s it has been wholesale funding
distress that is seen as the central characteristic of modern bank runs. Hence, as Sum-
mers (1991) argues, the Schwartz deﬁnition of ﬁnancial crises seems overly restrictive
for the analysis of modern ﬁnancial systems.
Another option is to appeal to speciﬁc data as the criteria for deﬁning a ﬁnan-
cial crisis. But no single metric for deﬁning or ranking ﬁnancial crises seems usable.
For example, referring to the ﬁscal cost of governmental assistance to the ﬁnancial
system–e.g., the percentage of GDP absorbed by the rescue or assistance to troubled
institutions–does deliver a concrete number, but is a ﬂawed means of judging ﬁnancial
crises. This is brought out by the fact that the ﬁscal cost of federal assistance for the
U.S. S&L crisis was a larger share of GDP than most projections of the U.S. ﬁscal cost
of the post-2007 crisis, yet the post-2007 crisis is widely seen as having larger macroeco-
nomic implications.6 Indices of ﬁnancial crises based on commercial banks’ loan write-
6Treasury Secretary Geithner has noted this comparison (e.g., on Fareed Zakaria GPS, April 25,
2010). It is likely, furthermore, that a variable we emphasize in this paper–the form of aggregate de-
mand policy–is an important factor bearing on the relationship between the magnitude of a ﬁnancial
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oﬀs, on the other hand, are distorted by the existence of creditor/borrower/regulator
behavior, such as loan rescheduling and regulatory forbearance, which may postpone,
or substitute for, write-oﬀs.7 Write-oﬀs therefore may not indicate the current level of
banking distress.
The most promising way forward in constructing indices of ﬁnancial crises from data
is perhaps to aim for a portmanteau variable that combines various aspects of data on
ﬁnancial institutions’ condition. Constructing such a portmanteau index is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper. In lieu of a widely-agreed index, we proceed instead by
applying Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s nonquantitative deﬁnition referring to “bank-centered
ﬁnancial crises” (2009b, p. 215) associated with “the closure, merging, takeover, or
large-scale government assistance of an important ﬁnancial institution (or group of
institutions)...” (2009b, p. 10). We condition our analysis on this deﬁnition. In
so doing, we stress that our aim is not to challenge this deﬁnition, but instead to
establish that on its own terms this deﬁnition implies for the United States a diﬀerent
chronology from that in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b). In particular, our analysis
establishes that (i) events in 1973−1975, not included in Reinhart-Rogoﬀ’s chronology,
should be included, and the case is stronger for the United States than the United
Kingdom (for which Reinhart and Rogoﬀ do argue a crisis occurred in that period; and
(ii) the events of 1982−1984, not included in Reinhart-Rogoﬀ’s chronology, should be
regarded as a period of ﬁnancial crisis. We now proceed to now lay out the chronology
that underlies these points.
2.2 Financial Crisis I: 1973−1975–Commercial Bank Capital
Squeeze
Our ﬁrst proposal is to augment the list of U.S. ﬁnancial crises to include one not
considered by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a, 2009b): namely, the period 1973−1975. In
what follows, we lay out the key aspects of developments in 1973−1975 that justify
considering this a period of a ﬁnancial crisis in the United States.
U.S. postwar ﬁnancial developments in the period up to 1973 are well characterized
as featuring no banking or systemic ﬁnancial crisis. In his account of postwar ﬁnancial
crisis and its ultimate ﬁscal cost.
7Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b, p. 10) reject the write-oﬀs metric partly for this reason.
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Figure 1: Commercial banks’ equity capital (as percentage of total bank assets), 1959−2008.
Source: FDIC.
changes, Benjamin Friedman (1980, p. 13) noted, “There have been far fewer bank
failures, and–until 1974–essentially no failures at all of large banks.” Friedman’s
reference to 1974 here is a signiﬁcant qualiﬁcation. The mid-1970s featured major
problems for banks reﬂected in the behavior of the aggregate banking system, greater
than those observed in earlier postwar decades. Figure 1 plots the ratio of bank common
equity capital to the book value of aggregate commercial bank assets, using the annual
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Call Report data for FDIC-insured
banks.8 The series closely matches the plot of the ratio of bank equity to assets given
in Boyd and Gertler (1994) and the tabulated values in Barth and Litan (1998). Using
the series in Figure 1 as the metric, it is apparent that the most serious capital problem
for U.S. commercial banks in the whole postwar period occurred in the mid-1970s, when
the capital ratio reached a postwar trough.9
There are further indications that the mid-1970s was a period of ﬁnancial crisis in
the United States. Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns described the environment
8The series plotted is the ratio of the “Total Equity Capital” column of the “Liabilities and
Equity Capital, FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks” table (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp)
to the “Total Assets” column of the “Assets, FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks” table
(http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp).
9A similar picture of the deterioration in U.S. commercial banks’ capital position in the mid-1970s
is apparent in Berger, Herring, and Szegö’s (1995) capital ratio series.
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prevailing in late 1974 as one of “stresses and strains in the ﬁnancial system” (quoted
in Cohn, 1974). One of the strains, alluded to in the passage from Friedman (1980)
given above, was the ﬁrst series of large bank failures witnessed in the U.S. postwar
period. Watson (1975, p. 3) noted “several failures of large banks in 1974”; likewise,
the Washington Star of April 6, 1975, observed, “In the past two years, three big
banks have failed or been merged in distress situations” (Holusha, 1975). The banks
in question were the United States National Bank of San Diego (declared insolvent in
October 1973), the Franklin National Bank (the twentieth largest bank in the United
States, declared insolvent in October 1974), and the Security National Bank of New
York (the subject of an emergency merger in 1975).10 Noting these failures as part of a
sequence that culminated in 1975, Edwards and Scott (1979, p. 66) observe, “During
the last few years, a number of uncommonly large banks have failed.” Table 1 displays
data from Edwards and Scott (1979, Table 2.1) and also reports in real terms the dollar
amounts they give. The amounts of deposits of closed banks mark 1971−1975 out from
prior postwar half-decades; in addition, a breakdown in Edwards and Scott (1979, p.
67) indicates that 24 of the 34 banks that closed in 1971−1975 did so in 1973−1975.11
Table 1. Bank Failures and Crisis I
Period Avg. # of banks closed Total deposits of closed banks (avg. per year)
(per year) Current dollars 2005 dollars
1956−1960 4.0 $9 m $50.0 m
1961−1965 6.6 $24.4 m $126.3 m
1966−1970 6.4 $46.6 m $209.9 m
1971−1975 6.8 $1,021.2 m $3,533.4 m
Source: Edwards and Scott (1975, p. 67); ﬁnal column, authors’ calculations using annual
series on the GDP deﬂator from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED portal.
10As part of the liquidation process for both the National Bank of San Diego and Frankin National,
the FDIC arranged for the deposit business and some assets of the failed banks to be taken over by
other institutions. See Committee on Banking and Currency (1975), Committee on Housing, Banking
and Currency (1975), and Schwartz (1986) for details. Franklin National was given as the twentieth
largest U.S. bank in Committee on Banking and Currency (1975, p. 152).
11The table in Barth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft, and Wang (1986, p. 511) indicates that 1973 was the
year in which total assets of failed commercial banks surged dramatically, both in nominal and real
terms.
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In 1980, the Chairman of the Bank of America reﬂected on the running down of
bank capital during the early 1970s and the bank closures of the mid-1970s, and their
implications for still larger banks:
“. . . the rapid expansion of loans and investments in the early 1970s could not con-
tinue for long without proportionate additions to equity capital. Balance sheets of com-
mercial banks soon began showing signs of strain. . . [A]t the end of 1973, equity capital
equaled only 6.5 percent of total bank assets, a considerable decline from 9 percent at
the end of 1960. The closure of the United States National Bank of San Diego in 1973,
followed by the demise of Franklin National and the international reverberations of the
Bankhaus Herstatt failure, further escalated concerns over the soundness of the banking
system in this country and abroad.
“Against this backdrop, Bank of America adopted a policy of self-restraint in the
summer of 1974.”
Carron (1982, p. 398) notes that the problems of Franklin National led, in addi-
tion, to a period of elevated market interest rates at which commercial banks borrow,
reﬂecting “doubts about the safety of the banking system.” A further element of ﬁ-
nancial strain in the mid-1970s was the heightened prospect that the New York City
government would default, an uncertainty resolved by the provision of federal ﬁnancial
assistance to the city in late 1975.12 The mid-1970s also witnessed a heightening of
concern about widespread failure in the thrift industry (i.e., the industry then con-
sisting largely of savings and loan institutions). In 1974, Alan Greenspan raised the
prospect13 that the thrift industry might require a rescue in the form of a large-scale
infusion of funds from the federal government–an eventuality which was not realized
on this occasion.
In their classiﬁcation of ﬁnancial crises, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008b, 2009b) do not
include any episode from the postwar United States prior to the 1980s, even though
they categorize other countries (such as the United Kingdom) as being in a ﬁnancial
crisis during the mid-1970s. We believe however, that the developments outlined above,
12New York City’s near-default is discussed, in the context of the mid-1970s ﬁnancial distress, by
Schwartz (1986).
13As reported in Jensen (1974), and Dale (1974).
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Figure 2: Total uses of the terms “ﬁnancial crisis” or “banking crisis” in theWall Street Jour-
nal, the Washington Post, and the New York Times, by year. Source: Authors’ calculations
from Proquest database.
notably the strain on bank capital, the extent of bank closures or distress mergers, and
the risk of default of a leading municipal government, all classify the United States
as experiencing a ﬁnancial crisis during 1973−1975. This crisis saw a liquidation of a
major commercial bank, whereas the ﬁnancial crisis acknowledged for the same period
in the United Kingdom in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s chronology did not involve liquida-
tions or rescue operations for major commercial banks. The U.K. secondary banking
rescue in 1974, which Reinhart and Rogoﬀ do classify as occurring in a ﬁnancial crisis,
pertained to a class of nonbank ﬁnancial institutions, not to established commercial
banks.
Our case for 1973−1975 as a ﬁnancial crisis period is reinforced by a search of articles
in major U.S. newspapers. Figure 2 plots the hits by years of the terms “ﬁnancial crisis”
and “banking crisis,” in the collected electronic archives (in the Proquest database) of
theWall Street Journal, theWashington Post, and the New York Times. The Proquest
database covers these newspapers up to 1991, which is why the series in Figure 2 stops
in that year. The ﬁgure indicates that there was a noticeable peak in the mid-1970s in
the number of articles making reference to a banking or ﬁnancial crisis.
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2.3 Comparison with the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is classiﬁed in the chronologies of Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a)
and Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005) as having experienced ﬁnancial
crisis in 1974−1976. This reinforces our case for labeling the mid-1970s a ﬁnancial
crisis for the United States. The reason is that the United Kingdom’s problems in the
mid-1970s are less recognizable as a bank-centered ﬁnancial crisis than are those of the
United States.
The U.S. ﬁnancial crisis of 1973−1975 featured liquidation of two large commercial
banks. The U.K. ﬁnancial crisis of 1974−1976 (as designated by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ,
2009b, p. 388) witnessed no closure or liquidation of commercial banks. Rather, the
distress was concentrated in nonbank institutions. In the ﬁrst place, nonﬁnancial cor-
porations suﬀered a liquidity crisis, arising from the interaction of strict oﬃcial price
controls with rapid growth in costs. This corporate distress is one reason the term
“ﬁnancial crisis” is associated with the United Kingdom over this period–for exam-
ple, an American Banker report (Mendelsohn, 1974) was headlined, “U.K. Industry
Straining to Avoid Financial Crisis”–but, by the same token, that distress clearly did
not amount to a bank-centered crisis.
Another reason this episode is frequently treated as one of ﬁnancial crisis is that
certain U.K. nonbank ﬁnancial institutions entered diﬃculties in the mid-1970s. Specif-
ically, late 1973 saw the rescue of some members of what were called the “secondary
banking” sector. A Financial Times analysis of the secondary banking crisis noted the
secondary banks had “a good deal less than full banking status,” and noted that they
tended to be involved in investment banking (Blanden, 1973). This brings out the fact
that the secondary banks–their name notwithstanding–were not commercial banks
but rather were investment banking-type institutions. Their diﬃculties arose primarily
from the impact of the 1973 crash in U.K. equity and housing prices on their real estate-
and equity-related loans and investments. The Governor of the Bank of England at
the time of the secondary banking rescue, Gordon Richardson, later testiﬁed: “The
secondary banks were nonbanks.” (October 27, 1992, testimony, in Treasury and Civil
Service Committee, 1993, p. 93.)
To recapitulate: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b) classify the United Kingdom as hav-
ing a bank-centered ﬁnancial crisis in the mid-1970s, while they treat the United States
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as crisis-free over the same period. In the mid-1970s some large U.S. commercial banks
were formally declared insolvent. By contrast, the United Kingdom witnessed no com-
mercial bank failures over this period; indeed, the commercial banks were strong enough
to share the cost with the Bank of England of the rescue of the secondary banks. Using
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009b, p. 216) criterion of a “bank-centered ﬁnancial crisis,”
the case for treating the United States as having a ﬁnancial crisis in 1973−1975 is
actually stronger than it is for the United Kingdom.
2.4 Financial Crisis II: 1982−1984–LDC Debt Threat
Many studies of U.S. banking developments in the 1980s concur on the position that
a U.S. banking crisis began in 1982. For example, Litan (1994, p. 535) judges that
“the initial bank crisis arose in 1982,” and his table of U.S. banking crises in the
1980s associates 1982 with the “LDC [less developed countries] debt crisis” (1994, p.
527); Boyd and Gertler (1994, p. 1) state that “the greatest crisis in U.S. commercial
banking since the Great Depression” started in 1982; and Benati and Goodhart (2010),
along with many others, date the commencement of the crisis to August 1982, when
the prospect arose of the Mexican government defaulting on borrowings from U.S.
commercial banks.
According to Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2008, 2009a) chronology of ﬁnancial crises,
however, the United States has suﬀered a single ﬁnancial crisis in the pre-2007 post-
war period–the savings-and-loan crisis, which they characterize as beginning in 1984.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ therefore overlook what Benati and Goodhart (2010) label “the
second most severe ﬁnancial crisis”14 of the 1979−2008 period–one that began before
1984, and did not originate in the savings and loan industry. As already noted, the
key factor associated with this ﬁnancial crisis was the elevated prospect of a default by
several Latin American governments on their borrowings from major U.S. commercial
banks. The natural starting date for this U.S. banking crisis is 1982; we argue below
that the culmination of the crisis can be viewed as the U.S. government’s rescue of the
Continental Illinois Bank in July 1984.
U.S. policymakers described developments from late 1982 in crisis terms, both pub-
14“Second,” that is, to the crisis beginning in 2007, close to the end of the period considered by
Benati and Goodhart (2010).
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licly and privately. For example, in the Federal Open Market Committee deliberations
of October 5, 1982, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker observed, “it’s patently
obvious that Mexico was going to borrow all it could borrow and all the banks were
going to give them and at some point that was going to come to an end. And it was
going to be a crisis situation. . . We can’t have a banking system that’s totally loaned
up to Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Yugoslavia, but that’s the direction
they were going in. And some day that had to stop.”15 Publicly, Chairman Volcker
observed in November 1982 said the LDC debt situation implied a threat to ﬁnancial
stability “essentially without precedent in the postwar period.”16 In 1983, the Chair-
man of the FDIC testiﬁed (Isaac, 1983, p. 115), “overly aggressive lending policies by
some U.S. banks have made our banks vulnerable to the performance and policies of
foreign governments.”
The assessment of a crisis situation was reﬂected in much ﬁnancial commentary,
such as the following observation in a Financial Times survey of May 24, 1983 (Kalet-
sky, 1983): “The stability of the international banking system has been directly im-
periled by the Third World’s inability to service its debts.” This type of commentary
is also manifested in an surge during 1982−1984 in references in key U.S. newspapers
to a banking or ﬁnancial crisis (see Figure 2 above).
Not only the prospect of what might happen to vulnerable U.S. banks, but the real-
ity of banking failures, point to a U.S. banking crisis being in force during 1982−1984.
While, as Bernanke (1983, p. 154) observed, lending to LDCs was “highly concen-
trated among a relatively few large banks,” the LDC debt threat emerged against
a background of distress among smaller banks. Many commercial banks came into
diﬃculties through their energy-related investments and, like the LDCs, found their
ﬁnancial position worsened by the commodity price decline after 1981 (Isaac, 1983).
U.S. commercial bank failures exhibit an upward trend during the 1980s, but the most
dramatic percentage increase in bank failures occurred in 1982: this is clear from Fig-
ure 3, which plots the growth rate of Boyd and Gertler’s (1994) series on U.S. bank
failures. Consistent with this impression, in 1983 the Chairman of the FDIC further
testiﬁed (Isaac, 1983, p. 115), “Bank failures have increased during the past decade
15From Federal Open Market Committee Transcript (1982, p. 21).
16Volcker (1982); this portion of Volcker’s remarks was quoted in Bacon (1982).
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Figure 3: Percent increase in number of bank failures, 1980−1991. Source: Calculated from
Boyd and Gertler (1994, Table 1.2).
and even more dramatically during the past year. In 1982 alone, the FDIC handled 42
bank failures. We expect the failure rate for 1983 to be at least as high. So far this
year, ﬁfteen banks have failed... [T]here is a greater sense of bank exposure and risk of
failure that exists not just among those who regulate and follow banks but with the
general public as well.” This depiction of the situation contrasts with Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ’s characterization of 1982 and 1983 as featuring no banking crisis.
The elevated pace of bank failures in 1982 was reﬂected most visibly in the failure of
the Penn Square Bank (based in Ohio) in July 1982. While this bank was not nationally
famous prior to its failure, its collapse received wide attention and was the subject of
lengthy Congressional hearings (Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Aﬀairs,
1982, 1983). The nature of the Penn Square failure was notable because it featured
substantial losses for uninsured depositors (Nadler, 1983a) and because a much larger
commercial bank, Continental Illinois, had major investments in Penn Square. The
losses from Penn Square came on top of the loan problems that Continental, which
was the eighth largest commercial bank in the United States in 1984, incurred from
the LDC situation.17
17Continental Illinois suﬀered about $220 million in the second quarter of 1982 in losses related to
Penn Square (Weiner, 1982). Continental was said to have “something over $1 billion” in loans to
Mexico in August 1982 (Carson, 1982); U.S. banks as a whole held roughly $25 billion of the Mexican
government’s debt by that point (Norton, 1982). References to Continental Illinois’ status as the
14
The ﬁnancial crisis of 1982−1984 led to the U.S. government rescue of Continental
Illinois Bank in July 1984. This rescue followed earlier stabilization operations by the
authorities in May 1984, at which time an article in American Banker had observed,
“Continental in fact has been suﬀering a steady decline in ﬁnancial condition for the
last two years” (Forde, 1984).18
Large U.S. commercial banks, especially Continental, thus were in a relatively
strained position over the years 1982 to 1984, not in 1984 alone. While 1984 should
indeed be considered a ﬁnancial crisis year, the positions that it was the initial year of
a ﬁnancial crisis and that the relevant crisis should be labeled the “S&L crisis” seem
out of line with the record of banking developments. Rather, 1984 can be thought
of as the year that produced the most serious repercussions for commercial banks of
the LDC debt threat that emerged in 1982. The institution whose fate was the most
prominent feature of that crisis–Continental Illinois–is not mentioned by Reinhart
and Rogoﬀ (2009a, 2009b).
The rescue of Continental Illinois in July 1984 can be considered the culmination
of the U.S. banking crisis associated with LDC debt problems, and the rescue date
accounts for our choice of the years 1982−1984 as the years for this ﬁnancial crisis.
It is true that U.S. commercial bank recapitalization operations in the wake of the
LDC loan problems proceeded beyond 1984 (just as the 1973−1975 crisis was followed
by years of bank recapitalization); also, of course, concerns about LDC debt did not
end in 1984.19 But 1984 was the year in which a large U.S. commercial bank required
a rescue as a result of the LDC debt threat. Bank failures reached their peak rate
of increase in 1982−1984. The events in 1985−1987 do not exhibit characteristics
typically associated with ﬁnancial crises. Litan’s (1994) tabulation of ﬁnancial crises
in the 1980s lists, for 1985, thrift deposit runs that were limited to a couple of U.S.
states;20 Litan gives no crises in 1986; and for 1987 Litan lists only the stockmarket
crash, which did not lead to a systemic ﬁnancial crisis or banking crisis in the United
eighth largest U.S. commercial bank appear in a number of sources, including Bennett (1984).
18Likewise, a May 1984 New York Times report stated, “Continental has experienced earnings
diﬃculties for almost two years” (Bennett, 1984).
19According to Dornbusch (1985), however, the view gained ground over the course of 1984 that
the LDC debt problem would be managed without the world economy being set back.
20These runs were not indicative of a national S&L crisis because the runs pertained to particular
types of thrift that were insured by the Ohio and Maryland governments; see Mester (1990, p. 16)
and Litan (1994).
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Figure 4: Loan charge-oﬀs as a share of total bank loans, percent, 1959−2008. Source:
FDIC.
States.21 The absence of U.S. banking crises in the middle years of the 1980s is reﬂected
in the fact that loan charge-oﬀs as a ratio to average total loans made by commercial
banks actually underwent a period of leveling oﬀ and decline during the mid-to-late
1980s (see Figure 4).22
Reﬂecting on the 1982 events in a May 1987 editorial, the Financial Times said:
“Mr. Volcker recognized the need for an abrupt change of stance when Mexico found
it was unable to meet its obligations in August 1982. And by any historical standard
the Fed’s role in the management of the resulting ﬁnancial crisis was impressive.”
(Financial Times, May 26, 1987; emphasis added.)
This editorial explicitly refers to 1982 as witnessing a “ﬁnancial crisis,” support-
ing our chronology. Moreover, the editorial clearly puts that ﬁnancial crisis in the
past tense, which supports our treatment of the U.S. ﬁnancial crisis associated with
21It is widely accepted that, as forcefully argued by Friedman and Schwartz (1963), a major stock-
market decline does not in and of itself imply a ﬁnancial crisis.
22Figure 4 is calculated by expressing FDIC annual data on commercial banks’ “net loan and lease
charge-oﬀs” (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp) as a percentage of “net loans and leases” of
commercial banks (http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/hsobRpt.asp). Figure 4 closely matches the ﬁgure,
covering a shorter period, plotted in Litan (1994, p. 546).
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international debt as ending prior to 1987.
2.5 Parallels with other crises
The 1973−1975 and 1982−1984 U.S. ﬁnancial crises have parallels with both traditional
U.S. banking crises and the post-2007 U.S. ﬁnancial crisis. Crisis I and Crisis II were
authentically bank-centered crises, as historical ﬁnancial crises had been; while they
also featured aspects of a modern-day run on a bank of the type that Gorton (2008)
and Bernanke (2010) highlight as a key characteristic of the crisis that started in 2007.
Let us now consider these parallels.
In important respects, Crisis I and Crisis II actually are more clearly recognizable as
traditional banking crises than either the subsequent S&L crisis or the recent crisis. In
Crisis I and Crisis II, the directly threatened institutions were institutions which served
as the intermediary channeling traditional deposit liabilities into loans. By contrast, as
late as 1980 S&L deposits were not included in the United States’ oﬃcial M1 and M2
monetary aggregates; and even after the deﬁnitions of these aggregates were widened
in 1980 to incorporate the more liquid liabilities of S&Ls, the contraction of the S&L
industry had a much more pronounced eﬀect on the behavior of the less widely watched
M3 series than on M1 and M2 (see Greenspan, 1990). Thus S&Ls remained predomi-
nantly creators of nonbank liabilities rather than of recognized deposit liabilities. The
2007 crisis was in the ﬁrst instance a crisis for nonbank ﬁnancial entities whose con-
nection to commercial banks was in large part via counterparty involvement and by
oﬀ-balance-sheet commitments of the banks. By contrast, Crisis I and Crisis II were
associated with more traditional features of banking crises–such as troubled banks
incurring deposit runs (notably Franklin National in 1974, and Continental Illinois in
1982−1984), and the prospect of a systemwide deposit contraction in the absence of
policy intervention. Crisis I and Crisis II thus ﬁt more closely than subsequent U.S.
crises Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009b, p. 216) criterion of being “bank-centered ﬁnancial
crises.”
Crisis I and Crisis II also exhibit important parallels with the post-2007 crisis. In
his testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on September 2, 2010, Fed-
eral Reserve Chairman Bernanke included a section entitled “Dependence on Unstable
Short-Term Funding” as a cause of the crisis. Chairman Bernanke testiﬁed, “Lead-
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ing up to the crisis, the shadow banking system, as well as some of the largest global
banks, had become dependent on various forms of short-term wholesale funding.” This
aspect of bank ﬁnancing is closely connected to the feature of banking highlighted
in a U.S. Senate Banking Committee analysis of the mid-1970s ﬁnancial crisis. On
that occasion, Senator William Proxmire stated (1975, p. III), “In order to support
increases in longer-term loans and holdings of riskier securities, banking institutions
have shifted their deposit liability base into forms of deposits and borrowings which
are more costly and often highly volatile. . . This massive shift in the composition of
the asset and liabilities structures of banking institutions poses certain dangers to the
banking system.” Homan (1975) viewed the mid-1970s ﬁnancial crisis as arising from
precisely this danger; noting the three major bank failures that we listed in Section
2.2, Homan (1975, p. 267) stated that “all three banks may have failed prematurely
because of a phenomenon which has come to be called ‘a modern run on banks.’” The
“modern run”–the loss or running-oﬀ of volatile wholesale funds–was discussed for
the speciﬁc case of Franklin National by Kane (1974, p. 849), who noted that “after
the rapid CD and federal-funds runoﬀs experienced by the Franklin National Bank, the
threat of bank failures weighed heavily on the minds of the [Federal Reserve] Board
and noticeably depressed the market for bank stocks.”
Likewise, the 1984 diﬃculties of Continental Illinois which were the peak of Cri-
sis II, took the form of what Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993) describe as “a run
on wholesale deposits.” During Continental’s diﬃculties, the Wall Street Journal re-
ported, on May 11, 1984, “More than most major banks, Continental relies on volatile
commercial deposits. . . [It] must buy most of its deposits from large businesses and ﬁ-
nancial institutions here and abroad. These companies, industry oﬃcials say, are more
likely than consumers to move their money to other institutions.” On this occasion,
the main deposits aﬀected were certiﬁcates of deposit, and Continental Illinois’ diﬃ-
culties in May 1984 were said in the Journal report to have “cast a pall over the whole
(certiﬁcate of deposit) market.” (Bailey and Zaslow, 1984.)
The propensity for volatile wholesale bank funding to trigger a modern run on banks
is emphasized in the accounts of the post-2007 crisis in Gorton (2008) and Bernanke
(2010). The instruments most subject to a run have changed since the 1970s: as we
have seen, Crisis I and Crisis II, the wholesale market in which the “modern run” was
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concentrated was that for wholesale certiﬁcates of deposit, while the 2007 and 2008
runs were concentrated in other short-term wholesale instruments. But the change in
the character of systemic bank runs from household deposit runs to their modern form
of runs on the wholesale market occurred with Crisis I in the 1970s and continued in
Crisis II in the 1980s.
2.6 Financial Crisis III: Savings and Loan Crisis–1988−1991
(not 1984−1991)
The one U.S. postwar ﬁnancial crisis Reinhart and Rogoﬀ allow for in the savings
and loan crisis, which they refer to as the “savings and loan crisis beginning in 1984”
(Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2008b, p. 7) or as “the savings and loan crisis of 1984” (2009b,
p. 460). The date given for the S&L crisis in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008b, p. 82)
is “1984−1991.”23 We argue that treating this crisis as taking place over the whole
1984−1991 period is to place the start of the crisis much too early. The alternative
dating of 1988−1991 has much support in the literature and is reﬂected in the fact
that the intense deterioration in the S&L industry was concentrated in those years.
It is not clear how Reinhart and Rogoﬀ arrived at the 1984 date that they repeatedly
use in referring to the S&L crisis. Their tables of crises (2008b, Table A5; 2009b, p.
390) give the 1984−1991 dating and cite Caprio and Klingebiel (1993) and Bordo,
Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martínez-Pería (2001) as their sources of information on
the S&L crisis. Of these references, the study by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and
Martínez-Pería (2001) does not treat the United States as having a postwar ﬁnancial
crisis, so the sole apposite reference cited in the (2008b) table is Caprio and Klingebiel
(2003). Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) indeed give 1984−1991 as the date of the savings
and loan crisis. Another reference to the S&L crisis in Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a)
cites a diﬀerent paper, Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005), but continues
to use the 1984 date for the crisis; Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b, p. 216) also use
1984 as the starting date for the S&L crisis in their table on “Post World War II
bank-centered ﬁnancial crises,” and cite two papers, Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) and
23In his examination of existing accounts of pre-World War II banking crises, Jalil (2009) notes that
there are some variations across the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ studies in their prewar chronology, but that their
studies consistently associate the pre-2007 postwar period with a single ﬁnancial crisis that begins in
1984.
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Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005), that refer to the S&L crisis. Of these,
Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005), in contrast to Caprio and Klingebiel
(2003), give 1988−1991 as the date for the crisis, but otherwise provide the same
details (i.e., numbers of bank and S&L failures and cost of the federal support to
the ﬁnancial system) as appear in Caprio and Klingebiel’s (2003) detailing of the S&L
crisis. It is likely that the treatment in Caprio, Klingebiel, Laeven, and Noguera (2005)
should be taken as giving a more authoritative dating of the crisis than the 1984−1991
dating previously used in Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 2003); this seems consistent
with the subsequent use of the 1988−1991 dating by Laeven and Valencia (2008).
Thus, it is not clear that the 1984−1991 dating is justiﬁed even in the sources that
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ cite. Be that as it may, a strong case against 1984−1991 as the
date of the S&L crisis can be made by considering key aspects of the S&L decline.
Problems with the savings-and-loan industry had been apparent well before the
1980s; as Bernanke (1983, p. 150) observed, “The thrift industry has been the ‘prob-
lem child’ of the U.S. ﬁnancial sector for almost twenty years now.” The thrift industry
was long recognized as vulnerable because of the contrast between the long-term loan
commitments inherent in savings-and-loan lending for house purchase and the short
maturity of the industry’s deposit liabilities. In particular, periods of rising interest
rates and declining asset values tended to put savings and loan institutions in a precar-
ious position. Samuelson (1967, p. 58) characterized the position of savings and loan
institutions as a whole during the 1966 credit crunch as “technically insolvent”; and,
as noted above, during the 1973−1975 ﬁnancial crisis, leading ﬁnancial commentators
raised the prospect of a federal rescue of the thrift industry. It is therefore important
to distinguish between long-run weakness and actual crisis periods for the S&Ls. The
crunch point for savings and loan did not come until the 1980s, and culminated in a
federal rescue and an administered scaling down of the industry. It is not in dispute
that the S&L crisis came about sometime in the 1980s. At issue is whether Rein-
hart and Rogoﬀ (2009b) are correct to date the contraction of the S&L industry and
accompanying crisis to the period 1984−1991.
The long-term structural weakness of the savings and loan institutions was recog-
nized in 1960s commentary, as noted above. But this underlying problem did not
prevent periods of relative stability or growth in the S&L industry, and it would not be
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appropriate to classify these periods as part of the “S&L crisis.” Of particular relevance
for our purposes is that the period from 1983 onward actually featured a considerable
amount of growth in the industry, in the wake of a squeeze in 1980−1982. Interest-rate
levels observed during the monetary tightening of 1980−1982 heightened the pressure
on the S&L’s ﬁnancial position (see Litan, 1994, p. 527). But the decline in interest
rates in 1982−1983 and deposit interest rate deregulation were perceived as greatly re-
lieving the S&Ls’ position. One skeptic about the S&Ls’ future acknowledged in 1983
the “enthusiasm that so many institutional investors and analysts have for the thrift
industry today” (Nadler, 1983b). Many indices of actual S&L performance between
1983 and 1987 make it problematic to classify the mid-1980s as crisis years. Isaac (1994,
p. 560) notes that “S&Ls began a tremendous growth spurt” after 1982.24 Moreover,
failures of thrifts were lower in 1984 than in any other year in 1981−1989 (Litan, 1994,
p. 523).25
In 1985, although, as noted above, runs occurred on speciﬁc thrifts in Ohio and
Maryland, the systemic crisis had not begun. Chairman Volcker testiﬁed in September
1985, “I think what we’re seeing at the moment, at the current level of interest rates,
is that well-managed thrifts, including those that have remained heavily concentrated
in the home lending business, are doing quite well. . . [T]hey are potentially on the
road to recovery.”26 In March 1986, George Gould, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary of
Finance, argued that it was an opportune time to face the longer-term problems of the
savings and loan industry because “interest rates are down and many in the industry
are enjoying exceptional proﬁts.”27
Thus, while the longer-term problems of the S&L industry did not disappear in
1984−1987, they were known about before 1984 and did not prevent growth in the
24This growth is evident in the expansion of total assets of the S&L system over 1983-1987 given in
Barth (1991, p. 25), while Barth and Litan (1998, p. 144) show that returns on equity and returns
on assets in the S&L industry were positive in the years 1983-1986 while they were negative in the
years 1981, 1982 and 1987-1990.
25A related metric, the number of resolutions of savings and loan institutions, was lower in 1984
than in any other year in 1981−1989 (Barth, 1991, p. 63). In addition, Barth and Litan (1998, p.
144) show that, while the S&L industry’s equity-capital-to-assets ratio shows a downward trend in
the 1970s and 1980s, two of only seven years in 1969−1988 during which the ratio increased were 1985
and 1986.
26From September 11, 1985, testimony in Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing (1986a,
p. 1333).
27From March 4, 1986, written testimony in Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing (1986b,
p. 104).
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industry during the mid-1980s alongside much optimism about the industry’s longer-
term survival. The explosion of savings and loan failures took place in 1988, with Barth
(1991, p. 63) reporting a rise from 47 S&L resolutions in 1987 to 205 in 1988. Thus,
1988−1991, the date used in several sources but not by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ, is the
more compelling date for the S&L crisis. A factor intensifying U.S. ﬁnancial problems
over 1988−1991, moreover, was an eﬀort by commercial and savings banks, especially
in New England, to rein in asset growth in light of more stringent regulatory capital
requirements (Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Syron, 1991).
In following Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009b) 1984 dating, Schularick and Taylor
(2010, p. 32) note the discrepancy with other sources, but defend 1984 as the start of
the S&L crisis on the grounds that “the number of bank failures had started to increase
rapidly earlier [than 1988].” This, however, is a non sequitur when it comes to defending
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s chronology. The existence of pre-1988 banking failures does not
justify putting all pre-2007 U.S. postwar ﬁnancial crises under the “S&L crisis” rubric.
Nor does it justify treating 1984 as the beginning of a 1980s banking crisis. A more
appropriate procedure seems to consist of distinguishing the late 1980s S&L crisis from
other banking crises in the pre-2007 postwar experience.
2.7 Summary of the chronology
Table 2 summarizes our chronology of pre-2007 U.S. postwar ﬁnancial crises. For
comparison, Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2008b, 2009a, 2009b) chronology is also provided.
Table 2. Chronologies of postwar U.S. ﬁnancial crises before 2007
Reinhart-Rogoﬀ (2008b, 2009b) dating Alternative Chronology
Crisis Date Crisis Date
Crisis I: Bank Capital Squeeze 1973−1975
Crisis II: LDC Debt Threat 1982−1984
Savings and Loan Crisis 1984−1991 Crisis III: Savings and Loan Crisis 1988−1991
Source: Reinhart-Rogoﬀ dating: Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2008b, esp. p. 7 and Table A5, p.
82; 2009b, esp. pp. 215−216). Alternative chronology: see text.
The table brings out the elements of diﬀerence in our chronology. We include a
1970s ﬁnancial crisis–Crisis I; our chronology recognizes the LDC debt threat to U.S.
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banks–Crisis II, beginning in 1982 and culminating in the Continental rescue. Finally,
in keeping with a substantial prior literature, we specify a much later start for the S&L
crisis than Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s date of 1984.
3 Economic recoveries after U.S. ﬁnancial crises
With our revised chronology, we have three ﬁnancial crises in the postwar United States
from which to make a judgment about the pace of economic recovery after the crisis.
3.1 Recovery in the wake of Crisis I
Crisis I (1973−1975) coincided with a recession in the United States. Commentators
in early to mid-1975 predominantly regarded the prospects for a strong recovery as
bleak. Reasons for this pessimism were catalogued in a New York Daily News report
(Cahill, 1975),
“The sharper the business decline, the sharper the ensuing rebound. That was the
lesson of business boom-and-bust cycles of the past.
“Today, however, that conﬁdence seems to have been shaken. Consumers. . . have
turned pessimistic again. Interest rates are up. . . Energy prices also are on the move
again. . . Auto, housing and steel industries see better times, but nothing like the boom
times of 1972 and 1973. . .
“ [T ]he odds are growing that the economic recovery will be slow and painful.”
This assessment of the recovery outlook followedmany similar assessments of private
sector and government economists that had been made during 1975. For example, a
Bankers Trust analysis published in February 1975 stated, “the economic decline is not
expected to be followed by a prompt or vigorous recovery in business activity,” and
cited a poor outlook for the housing and automobile markets (Bankers Trust, 1975,
p. 580). Alice Rivlin of the CBO, in her July 1975 testimony to the Senate Budget
Committee, stated that “there is a danger that the recovery will not be very strong. . .
There is no obvious growth sector pushing the economy ahead. Housing doesn’t look
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Figure 5: The 1975 recovery compared to pre-1975 postwar recoveries. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED portal, authors’ calculations.
like it is going to be the bellwether sector, nor does the automobile industry, nor does
business investment.”28
Despite these reservations, the expansion that began in May 1975 actually produced
another instance of a vigorous recovery pattern of U.S. postwar period. Four-quarter
growth of real GDP to the ﬁrst quarter of 1976 was 5.9%.
Some perspective on how well the economy recovered in 1975 is brought out by
Figure 5. The ﬁgure indexes real GDP to its 1975Q1 trough and also plots the average
path of GDP in prior postwar recoveries,29 when each of these recoveries are expressed
relative to the trough of GDP. Instead of being the slow recovery predicted, the early
stages of the expansion that began in 1975 were right in line with the prior historical
experience, supporting McNees’ (1978, p. 45) judgment (on the basis of a similar
graph based on 1977-vintage data) that the expansion was “very typical of the postwar
period.”
Two aspects of the 1975 output revival are worth emphasizing. First, although
the ﬁrst year of this recovery featured considerably faster output growth than the
recovery from the 1969−1970 recession, the increase in real residential investment was
28From July, 15, 1975, testimony, in Committee on the Budget (1975, p. 4).
29Recoveries underlying the average in this ﬁgure include the 1949 recovery, following McNees
(1978). Starting with the 1954 recovery produces a similar average.
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slightly smaller. Consequently, the arithmetic contribution of this expenditure category
to the recovery’s ﬁrst year of real GDP growth of roughly 6 percent came at under
1 percentage point, whereas it had contributed about 1.25 percentage points to the
roughly 4.5 percent GDP growth observed in 1971. The less buoyant housing recovery
was thought to reﬂect a correction of earlier over-lending to the housing sector (Isaac,
1983). Structural adjustment in the housing sector in the mid-1970s proved consistent
with robust growth in the aggregate economy.
Second, this recovery occurred in the wake of the post-1973 productivity slowdown,
whose dimension policymakers initially did not grasp; this was one reason that the
trough in output in 1975 involved much less slack than thought at the time (Orphanides,
2003). A case can be made that the recovery was too typical. In retrospect, the
initial recovery was perhaps too impressive, and helped push the economy within a
couple of years back above potential, reversing the progress made toward price stability.
Policymakers, however, believed at the time that an expansion like that observed in
the postwar period was consistent with a noninﬂationary recovery. Their stimulative
policies succeeded in delivering the additions to aggregate demand that created such a
rapid expansion. The fact that total GDP exhibited a typical-sized recovery testiﬁes
to the predominance of the state of aggregate demand in determining output behavior
in the short term, even in the face of aggregate supply weakness.
3.2 Recovery in the wake of Crisis II
Whereas Crisis I coincided with a recession, most of Crisis II of 1982−1984 coin-
cided with a U.S. economic expansion. A recovery of the U.S. economy, following the
1981−1982 recession, began in late 1982 despite the emergence of the LDC debt threat,
and the early years of this recovery saw a historically strong rebound of GDP.
The leadup to the 1983 recovery provided a further instance, paralleling that in
1975, in which commentators and oﬃcials prematurely declared a break with the pat-
tern of past recoveries. In testimony to the Senate Appropriations Committee, CEA
Chairman Martin Feldstein said, “real GNP is forecast to rise 3.1% between the fourth
quarter of 1982 and the fourth quarter of 1983.”30 In a submission to the same com-
mittee, CBO Director Rivlin stated, “The CBO short-run forecast represents our best
30From February 16, 1983, testimony, in Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate (1983, p. 79).
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Figure 6: The 1983 recovery and average of pre-1983 postwar recoveries. Source: Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED portal, authors’ calculations.
judgment, and it shows real growth of 4.0 percent from the fourth quarter of 1982
to the fourth quarter of 1983... That would be a mild recovery by comparison with
previous recoveries. . . ”31 GDP outcomes in 1983 confounded these expectations. The
present vintage of data suggests that four-quarter growth in output to 1983Q4 was
7.4% using the real GDP deﬁnition of output, and 7.5% by the criterion of real GNP.
The ﬁrst two years of economic recovery were well above the prior postwar norm (Fig-
ure 6). This expansion of aggregate demand likely reﬂected in large part a reaction to
a sequence of monetary policy actions, notably a large reduction in short-term interest
rates, accompanied by rapid rates of monetary expansion, over the second half of 1982.
3.3 Recovery in the wake of Crisis III
According to our chronology, the S&L crisis took place over 1988−1991. The U.S.
economy experienced a slowdown from mid-1989 to mid-1990, followed by a recession
in 1990 and 1991. The initial recovery from this recession was indeed slow: the ﬁrst
31In Committee on Appropriations, U.S. Senate (1983, p. 140).
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four quarters’ growth of real GDP came to 2.6%, compared to an average of 6.3% for
recoveries in the four prior decades. On the surface, therefore the S&L crisis’ aftermath
does appear to be in keeping with the Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009a, 2009b) ﬁnding that
ﬁnancial crises are associated with slow economic recoveries.
But how plausible is it that ﬁnancial weakness was important in making this re-
covery slow? We have argued that aggregate demand policies, rather than the fact of a
prior ﬁnancial crisis, became the decisive factor underpinning the previous recoveries in
1975 and 1983. Aggregate demand also seems to have been the decisive factor for the
whole slowdown-recession-recovery cycle of 1988−1992. A policy tightening sequence
undertaken by the Federal Reserve pointed toward a cooling of the economy after 1988.
As Romer and Romer (1994), FOMC decisions in late 1988 are consistent with a de-
liberate restriction of the economy in light of inﬂation data, and both Ball (1993, p. 6)
and Romer and Romer (1994) list disinﬂationary monetary policy as a factor behind
the 1990−1991 recession. The fact that, notwithstanding the sustained monetary pol-
icy restriction of the late 1980s, the 1990−1991 recession was one of the mildest U.S.
recessions does not seem to leave much room for ampliﬁcation of the recession from
the S&L crisis.
What about the weakness of the early stages of the subsequent economic expan-
sion? Here the fact that the recession was mild has a bearing on the interpretation of
the recovery. As we noted in the introduction, much of the business cycle literature
emphasizes the relationship between the strength of the recovery and the severity of
the preceding recession: what Friedman (1964, 1993) calls the “plucking” property of
output. Figure 7 plots the growth rate in the ﬁrst year of postwar U.S. recoveries
(beginning in 1954) against the growth rate of GDP in the last year of the preceding
recession. There is a clear association (correlation = −070). The 1991 recovery falls
in line with the postwar pattern in the sense that, while the initial recovery of GDP
was the second weakest in the postwar period, the prior year’s decline in GDP was the
third smallest.
This statistical property should not, however, be taken as itself providing an expla-
nation for the weakness of the early 1990s recovery. The “plucking” property observed
in Figure 7 should not emerge independently of aggregate demand policy. If, as in
New Keynesian models, output is demand-determined in the short run, a suﬃciently
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Figure 7: Scatter of growth in ﬁrst year of recovery (y-axis) against growth in year to
recession trough (x -axis), U.S. postwar recoveries from 1954 to 2002. Source: Computed
from real GDP in Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED portal. Growth rates measured
as log-diﬀerences.
aggressive stimulation of aggregate demand by policymakers should be able to pro-
duce a rapid recovery even in the aftermath of a shallow recession. Thus, underlying
our argument that the early 1990s recovery was slow is the position that the 1990s
policymakers chose not to pursue an aggressive expansion of demand.
The details of policymaking are consistent with the position just outlined. Policy-
making during the early 1990s may be contrasted with that in the mid-1970s. As noted
above, policymakers in the mid-1970s failed to recognize that the 1973 output peak oc-
curred with output well above potential; furthermore, they did not grasp the post-1973
long-term economic slowdown. Policymakers therefore came out of the 1973−1975 re-
cession believing that there was a great amount of slack in the economy to be taken up.
And, as we have seen, their aggregate demand policies delivered an output expansion
that was initially right in line with pre-1975 recoveries. By contrast, policymakers in
the early 1990s recognized that the years to 1989 had been associated with output
above potential (see Orphanides, 2001, p. 969); hence, they were not inclined to sup-
port an economic expansion that made up for all the below-trend growth observed in
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1989−1991. And although data revisions later took away much of the decline in GDP
in 1990−1991, it was perceived even at the time as a mild recession. Finally, while in
1975 policymakers had not taken in the post-1973 slowdown in economic growth, by
1991 this long-term slowdown had been incorporated into their estimates of potential
GDP. All these considerations meant that policymakers were disinclined to produce
aggregate demand conditions conducive to a recovery of the same magnitude as the
postwar average.
The mildness of the recovery therefore largely reﬂected the carrying out of stabiliza-
tion policy. As Chairman Greenspan put it in January 1991 testimony, “we must take
care to avoid a policy that is overly stimulative. The amount of slack in the economy is
not great by historical standards, and an overly aggressive monetary easing could end
up being counterproductive.”32 This restrained approach guided the transition from the
1990−1991 recession to the early 1990s recovery, leading Stanley Fischer to comment
in 1994, “the Fed disinﬂated in a particular way in 1989, ’90, ’91, ’92, very successfully.
It did it slowly, it did it by cutting rates slowly and inﬂation came down. . . ”33
The fact that the recovery after 1991 was in broad outline consistent with the
stabilization goals of monetary policy leaves open the possibility that a signiﬁcant
portion of the weakness may nevertheless have arisen from the fact that the recovery
followed a ﬁnancial crisis. We investigate this possibility in the remainder of this paper.
4 Regression evidence
In this section we investigate systematically the link between postwar recoveries and
ﬁnancial crises. We estimate regressions in which the dependent variable, denoted
, is the average growth rate of output (measured as ﬁrst diﬀerences of log
real GDP) in the ﬁrst four quarters of the U.S. economic expansion. There are nine
observations on this variable, reﬂecting the nine economic recoveries from 1954 to 2002.
We use as an indicator of ﬁnancial crises a dummy variable equal to unity for recoveries
that are in the wake of ﬁnancial crises. We consider two such dummy variables: one
based on the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ (2009b) chronology of U.S. ﬁnancial crises, and one based
32Greenspan (1991, p. 170). In keeping with this observation, the Bank of England’s (1991)
commentary on the U.S. economy noted that economic recovery was “likely to be slower than in
previous upturns” because of the recession’s “relatively high level of capacity utilization.”
33June 9, 1994 remarks, quoted in Capie, Goodhart, Fischer, and Schnadt (1994, p. 326).
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on our alternative chronology. According to the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ chronology, there has
been only one pre-2007 ﬁnancial crisis in the postwar United States, and the recovery in
its aftermath is the recovery following the 1990−1991 recession. The dummy variable
associated with this chronology is accordingly deﬁned as
 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 for  = 8 (i.e., the recovery after 1990− 1991);
0 for  = 1  7 and  = 9 (all the rest)
In our alternative chronology, the 1975 and 1983 recoveries were also recoveries in
the wake of ﬁnancial crises, so the indicator variable associated with our alternative
chronology is deﬁned as:
 =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 for  = 5,  = 7, and  = 8;
0 for  = 1  4 and  = 6, and  = 9
In Table 4 we initially report simple regressions of the dependent variable on each
of these dummy variables. The dummy variable has a negative coeﬃcient (the right
sign) but is statistically insigniﬁcant. The correlation of this dummy with economic
recoveries is −0483. When we estimate the same speciﬁcation with the indicator
 based on our own chronology of ﬁnancial crises, the variable has no explanatory
power, having an almost precisely zero correlation with economic recoveries (correlation
−0023). There is thus no association between the size of recoveries and the existence
of ﬁnancial crises in the United States if an indicator based on our reﬁned chronology
is used.
We emphasized in Section 3 the insight of the business cycle literature that the size
of expansion and severity of preceding downturn. We suggested that this pattern can be
interpreted as reﬂecting the aggregate demand policies pursued, and that these policies
rather than the ﬁnancial crisis may be primarily responsible for the slow recovery from
1991 onward. We now investigate this matter further by estimating the impact of
ﬁnancial crises on economic recoveries after controlling for the severity of the prior
downturn. To do so, we estimate the multiple regression,
| = 0 + 1| + 2
where  is the crisis dummy (i.e.,  or , depending on the speciﬁcation
estimated), and | is the variable plotted in the x-axis of Figure 7; that is to
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say, it is the growth rate of GDP for the four quarters up to and including the trough
of the prior recession.34
We would expect 1 ≤ 0. If 1 = 0, there is no systematic relation between the
size of an economic expansion and the severity of the preceding downturn (holding the
ﬁnancial-crisis indicator variable constant). If 1  0, then growth is related to the
scale of the prior downturn. If 1 = −15, for example, then the ﬁrst year of expansion
makes up for the loss of output in the ﬁnal year of the recession and, on top of that, the
economy grows by an amount equal to 50% of the recession-year loss. In circumstances
where a recession has created a negative output gap and potential output is growing
smoothly at rate 0, a value of 1 ≤ −10 implies that the ﬁrst year of the recovery
witnesses GDP growth relative to potential rapid enough to make inroads into the
output gap.
In the multiple regression, the estimated coeﬃcient on the ﬁnancial-crisis dummy
indicates whether a ﬁnancial crisis aﬀects the extent of the output rebound; a negative
coeﬃcient means that the revival in GDP is held back below the recovery path that
one would normally expect given the scale of the preceding downturn.
We begin with a simple regression excluding the dummy. This suggests that there
is indeed a statistically signiﬁcant “plucking” property in U.S. postwar recoveries, with
a recession tending to produce growth 14 times the absolute value of the prior year’s
percent output decline. When we add the dummy variable for ﬁnancial crises that
is based on the Reinhart-Rogoﬀ chronology, this dummy is statistically insigniﬁcant,
while prior growth remains signiﬁcant. When we use the dummy variable implied on
our alternative chronology of ﬁnancial crises, there is even less evidence of a bracing
eﬀect of ﬁnancial crises on economic recoveries; the dummy’s coeﬃcient estimate and
t-statistic are even lower.
34Like the dependent variable, however, this variable is expressed in quarterly units in the regres-
sions, while the data in Figure 7 are in annual units, so are simply four times the values entering the
regressions. A tabulation of all data used in the regressions is provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.
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Table 4. Economic recovery regressions
Dependent variable: Real GDP growth in the ﬁrst year of recovery
All recoveries 1954− 2002 (# of observations = 9)
Variable Simple Regressions Multiple Regressions
Constant 00149
(00020)
00136
(00024)
00087
(00023)
00098
(00022)
00090
(00026)
Financial crisis dummy—
Reinhart-Rogoﬀ () −000795
(00055)
− − −00064
(00041)
−
Financial crisis dummy—
alternative chronology () − −000025
(00042)
− − −00064
(00041)
Average growth in the ﬁnal four
quarters of prior recession − − −13606
(05213)
−12486
(04806)
−13806
(05608)
2 0233 0001 0493 0639 0503
 00051 00059 00042 00038 00045
Excluding Recovery from 1980 Recession (# of observations = 8)
Constant 00149
(00020)
00142
(00028)
00089
(00024)
00102
(00021)
00096
(00027)
Financial crisis dummy—
Reinhart-Rogoﬀ () −00085
(00057)
− − −00069
(00039)
−
Financial crisis dummy—
alternative chronology () − −00008
(00045)
− − −00019
(00033)
Average growth in the ﬁnal four
quarters of prior recession − − −13979
(05303)
−12833
(04616)
−14404
(05672)
2 027 0005 0537 0713 0566
 00053 00062 00042 00037 00045
Memo item: Simple correlations of dummy with dependent variable:
 : −0483; excluding 1980 recovery: −0520.
 : −0023; excluding 1980 recovery: −0074.
Terrones, Scott, and Kannan (2009) argue for treating 1980−1982 as one long
recession when studying U.S. economic recoveries. We consider this alternative in the
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bottom half of the table by dropping the 1980−1981 recovery from the observations
used in the regressions. The resulting estimates are little changed. There is still a
systematic relation between the size of recoveries and the severity of the prior recession,
and no signiﬁcant eﬀect of the crisis dummies. In particular, the estimated coeﬃcient
on the dummy variable , representing our chronology of ﬁnancial crises, is low
and statistically insigniﬁcant. The evidence in Table 4 therefore suggests that, for the
postwar United States, economic recoveries are not systematically slower in the wake
of ﬁnancial crises.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered the relationship between ﬁnancial crises and economic
recoveries in the pre-2007 postwar record of the United States. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ
(2009a, 2009b) emphasize the lessons for the United States that can be drawn from the
postwar experience with ﬁnancial crises outside the United States. While we concur
that international experience can be informative, we believe that U.S. postwar record
prior to 2007 is more informative on this issue than Reinhart and Rogoﬀ suggest.
Reinhart and Rogoﬀ’s (2009b) account of U.S. ﬁnancial crises is questionable on several
counts. They treat the 1970s as free of ﬁnancial crises in the United States, even though
the mid-1970s witnessed banking stresses that saw banks’ equity capital ratio plunge
to a postwar low. Reinhart and Rogoﬀ do not treat 1982 and 1983 as years of ﬁnancial
crisis, despite the pressure in those years on U.S. commercial banks induced by the
LDC debt position. And the single pre-2007 postwar crisis for the postwar United
States acknowledged in their analysis–i.e., the savings and loan crisis–is referred to
by Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2009b) as “the savings and loan crisis of 1984,” even though
S&L failures actually were lower in 1984 than in any other year in 1981−1989.
We provided our own alternative chronology of ﬁnancial crises in the United States,
which added crises in 1973−1975 and 1982−1984 and, in keeping with the bulk of the
literature, treated the S&L crisis as starting in the late 1980s rather than in 1984.
With this revised chronology, we carried out a case-by-case analysis of recoveries after
ﬁnancial crises as well as a statistical analysis of postwar recoveries as a whole. We
found that the evidence does not support the notion that ﬁnancial crises have had a
systematic eﬀect in slowing economic recoveries in the United States.
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Given the wide acknowledgement of the connections between the ﬁnancial sector
and aggregate economic behavior, why is it that ﬁnancial crises do not seem to have
had a systematic connection with the speed of economic recoveries? We suggested
that the key factor is aggregate demand policy. If output is demand-determined in the
short run, strongly stimulative aggregate demand policies can have their eﬀects felt on
output even when the ﬁnancial sector is weak. And, as suggested in the introduction, a
rapid economic expansion could then relieve the positions of banks considerably, further
diminishing the eﬀects of the prior ﬁnancial crisis. These considerations suggest that
judgments about the eﬀects of ﬁnancial crises on output behavior in the United States
require an even greater focus on the the factors bearing on aggregate demand.
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Appendix
Table A1. Data used in regressions in Table 3
Average real GDP Average real GDP Dummy for ﬁnancial crises
growth, ﬁrst four growth, four quarters chronology
Recovery quarters of prior to Reinhart-
begining recovery recovery Rogoﬀ Alternative
Observation (|) (|) () ()
1 1954Q3 0.0189614 −0.0063958 0 0
2 1958Q2 0.0180886 −0.0077123 0 0
3 1961Q2 0.0181241 −0.0025089 0 0
4 1971Q1 0.0108962 −0.0003887 0 0
5 1975Q2 0.0149432 −0.0058902 0 1
6 1980Q4 0.0107398 −0.0041511 0 0
7 1983Q1 0.0186439 −0.0035541 0 1
8 1991Q2 0.0064399 −0.0024262 1 1
9 2002Q1 0.0047588 0.0010034 0 0
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